Recent Decisions by unknown
Maryland Law Review
Volume 36 | Issue 1 Article 12
Recent Decisions
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
This Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Recent Decisions, 36 Md. L. Rev. 255 (1976)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol36/iss1/12
Recent Decision
LANDLORD-TENANT - DuE PROCESS - TENANT OF FEDERALLY
SUBSIDIZED HOUSING MAY NOT BE EVICTED UPON EXPIRATION OF
LEASE ABSENT A SHOWING OF GOOD CAUSE - Green v. Copperstone
Limited Partnership.'
On September 5, 1974, Ms. Helen Green, a tenant in the federally
subsidized Copperstone Circle Apartments in Columbia, Maryland,2 re-
ceived a letter notifying her that she was to vacate her apartment on or
before October 31, 1974. The landlord stated no reason for this action3
other than to note that it was acting in accordance with the fourth para-
graph of Ms. Green's lease:
Unless terminated as provided herein, this lease shall be auto-
matically renewed for successive terms of one month each at the afore-
said rental. . . . Either party may terminate this lease at the end of
the initial term or any successive term by giving 30 days written notice
in advance to the other party.
4
Upon Ms. Green's refusal to vacate, the landlord brought a Complaint
in Ejectment - Tenant Holding Over 5 in the District Court for Howard
County, where it was granted restitution of the leased premises. Ms.
Green appealed to the circuit court and, upon again being ordered to
1. 28 Md. App. 498, 346 A.2d 686 (1975).
2. It has been estimated that in the Baltimore metropolitan area there are twelve
thousand housing units subsidized by sections 221(d) (3) and 236 of the National
Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-49bbb-9 (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 12 U.S.C. §§
1701-50g (1970). The Sun (Baltimore), Nov. 5, 1975, § C, at 1, col. 1. See note 21
infra.
3. 28 Md. App. at 501-02, 346 A.2d at 689. At trial the landlord alleged that
Ms. Green had caused substantial damage to her apartment, id. at 516-17, 346 A.2d at
697, but this claim was not raised in the notice to vacate or in the subsequent complaint
brought by the landlord in its attempt to regain possession of the leased premises.
Id. See note 78 inf ra.
4. 28 Md. App. at 501, 346 A.2d at 689 (emphasis added). This provision, in
effect, created a month to month tenancy. See 2 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 254
(P.J. Rohan rev. ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as POWELL].
5. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-402 (1974). Subsection (b) (1) states:
Where any interest in property shall be leased for any definite term or at will,
and the landlord shall desire to repossess the property after the expiration of the
term for which it was leased and shall give notice in writing one month before the
expiration of the term or determination of said will to the tenant or to the person
actually in possession of the property to remove from the property at the end of
the term, and if the tenant or person in actual possession shall refuse to comply
therewith, the landlord may make complaint thereof in writing to the District
Court of the county where the property is located.
(255)
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vacate, filed a petition for certiorari in the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals6 alleging a denial of due process of law under the fifth7 and
fourteenth8 amendments. Ms. Green contended that due process requires
that a federally subsidized landlord must have good cause for evicting a
tenant even where the lease contains a provision granting the landlord
general power to terminate upon notice, and that the landlord must afford
the tenant notice and a hearing on the issue of good cause. Since Ms.
Green conceded that the Maryland ejectment proceedings afforded the
tenant procedural due process on any cause for eviction contained in the
complaint,9 her case rested on two issues: First, does the due process
clause of either amendment apply to the termination of leases of tenants
in federally subsidized housing, and second, if they do apply, is the ter-
mination of such a lease, merely upon its expiration, a denial of due
process? The Court of Special Appeals reversed the circuit court, finding
that the fifth amendment was applicable and that due process demands a
"good cause" eviction. The court limited its holding to three propositions:
"(a) that landlord is bound to assure due process to the tenant; (b) that
due process requires a hearing and proof of good cause for eviction after
notice of the grounds upon which eviction is sought and (c) that mere
expiration of the term of a lease is not such good cause."' 0 Maryland
thus became one of the few states" to join a growing number of federal
courts' 2 in granting this relief to tenants.
The result reached by the Court of Special Appeals in Green is, of
course, a radical departure from the common law. Historically a lease-
hold estate ended upon "the expiration of the period for which the estate
was created to exist."' 81 Upon expiration of the lease the landlord was
entitled to resume immediate possession; there was no requirement that
notice be given to the tenant since the landlord-tenant relationship was
6. Execution of the judgment was stayed pending certiorari review. 28 Md.
App. at 500, 346 A.2d at 688.
7. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V provides that "[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 states that "[n]o State shall . . . deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ..
9. See notes 73-74 and accompanying text infra.
10. 28 Md. App. at 517, 346 A.2d at 697. For a discussion of permissible causes
for eviction in Maryland, see Rhynhart, Notes on the Law of Landlord and Tenant,
20 MD. L. REV. 1 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Rhynhart].
11. See Appel v. Beyer, 39 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 7, 114 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1974);
Jenkins v. Allen Temple Dev., 127 Ga. App. 61, 192 S.E.2d 714 (1972); Bonner v.
Park Lake Housing Dev. Fund Corp., 70 Misc. 2d 325, 333 N.Y.S.2d 277 (Sup.
Ct. 1972).
12. See, e.g., Lopez v. Henry Phipps Plaza South, Inc., 498 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.
1974); Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973); Anderson v. Denny, 365 F.
Supp. 1254 (W.D. Va. 1973); McClellan v. University Heights, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 374
(D.R.I. 1972); McQueen v. Druker, 317 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Mass. 1970), aff'd, 438
F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971).
13. 2 POWELL, supra note 4, at § 247.
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deemed to have terminated automatically.14 But as one commentator in
discussing year to year tenancies noted, this
was early found to leave each party too much at the mercy of the
other; and the courts seized on any circumstance which could be
construed to indicate an intention to require a reasonable notice to
terminate the tenancy. . . . In time it was held that six months'
notice expiring at the period of the year at which the tenancy began
was such reasonable notice .... 15
As previously indicated,1 6 summary eviction proceedings are now in-
stituted in Maryland when the landlord has given notice to the tenant
one month prior to the expiration of the term and the tenant has failed
to quit the premises. 17 Prior to Green, mere termination of a lease, if
accompanied by the requisite notice, would entitle the landlord to the
premises - the common law, with its subsequent statutory revisions, had
not varied the substantive rights of the parties in this regard. There
was no right to housing that would demand a showing of good cause, or
of any cause, prior to eviction.'8 Green created a right to housing for
tenants of federally subsidized projects by allowing continued occupation
until such time as the landlord is able to show good cause for their eviction.
To establish this right to housing through the due process clause, the
.court first had to determine that the clause was applicable. This involved
a two pronged approach: As a preliminary step, it was necessary to show
that there was sufficient federal or state involvement for the operation
of the fifth or fourteenth amendment's guaranty of "due process of law," 19
14. E.g., Smith v. Pritchett, 168 Md. 347, 350, 178 A. 113, 114-15 (1935).
15. R. VENABLE, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY AND LEASEHOLD ESTATES IN
MARYLAND 60 (1892) (citation omitted). Professor Powell expressed the view that
the requirement of notice was of special importance in terminating tenancies that
existed from period to period, for "[t]he most characteristic aspect of an estate from
period to period is its continuity." 2 POWELL, supra note 4, at § 253. The requirement
of notice protects the tenant's interest in continuity by insuring that if notice is not
given within the required time prior to the end of a period, the tenancy will continue
for at least one more period. Id.
16. See note 5 supra.
17. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-402(b) (1974). See generally Rhynhart,
supra note 10.
18. But see Michelman, The Advent of a Right to Housing: A Current Appraisal,
5 HARv. Civ. RIGHTS - CIv. LIB. L. REV. 207, 219-23 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Michelman].
It must be stressed that Green applies only to situations where the landlord's
action is found to be governmental as the due process clauses do not reach private
conduct. See, e.g., Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (the fourteenth amend-
ment "erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or
wrongful.") ; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
19. 28 Md. App. at 504, 346 A.2d at 690-91.
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and secondly, it was necessary to show that the tenant was deprived of
either "liberty [or] property" by the eviction proceedings. 20
In determining whether the due process clause was operative in
Green, it was first necessary to examine the extent of governmental
involvement in the operation of the Copperstone Circle Apartments. These
apartments were developed pursuant to section 236 of the National Hous-
ing Act,21 "a statutory scheme seeking to achieve improved housing at
reduced rentals for low and middle income families. ' 22 This is accom-
plished through reduced rentals,23 rental supplements, 24 low mortgage
rates,2 5 and similar subsidies. Under the act the Secretary of the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development has the power "to make
rules and regulations, to enter into such agreements, and to adopt such
procedures as he may deem necessary .. ".. ,,2 including the power to
set rental and tenant eligibility standards. 27
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment applies only
where the state, through its actions, is deemed to have deprived any
person of life, liberty, or property.2 8 While it is not necessary that the
state bring its power to bear directly upon the party alleging a denial
of due process, the degree of state involvement in private conduct that
is required to constitute "state action" has been an elusive standard.
29
20. See id. at 507, 346 A.2d at 692, .quoting Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1239
(4th Cir. 1973). While the due process clauses protect "life, liberty, or property,"
there were no possible claims that Ms. Green would be deprived of her "life"
by eviction.
21. 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1970).
Many of the cases that have dealt with the right to good cause evictions have con-
cerned housing subsidized under section 221(d) (3) of the National Housing Act, 12
U.S.C. § 17151 (Supp. 1974), amending 12 U.S.C. § 1715 (1970). Both section
236 and section 221 (d) (3) housing programs involve similar degrees of governmental
involvement and are, for the purpose of deciding whether the due process clauses
apply, indistinguishable. See Anderson v. Denny, 365 F. Supp. 1254, 1258 (W.D. Va.
1973) : "But a comparison of § 221 (d) (3) . . . with § 236 .. . indicates very little
difference in the. degree of government involvement in the two programs. The § 236
program involves somewhat more in the way of government subsidies [but] both
programs involve virtually the same government regulations." See also 28 Md. App.
at 506 n.6, 346 A.2d at 691 n.6.
22. 28 Md. App. at 503, 346 A.2d at 690.
23. 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1(f) (Supp. IV, 1974).
24. 24 C.F.R. 215.5, 215.10 (a) (7) (1975).
25. This is accomplished through periodic interest reduction payments. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1715z-l(a) (1970).
26. 12U.S.C.§1715z-1(h) (1970).
27. 12U.S.C.§1715z-l(e) (1970).
28. See, e.g., Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
29. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Columbia
Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973); Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) ; Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term - Foreword:
"State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69
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The Supreme Court's treatment of this problem has been intentionally
vague; in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority30 the Court deter-
mined that when a state had "so far insinuated itself into a position of
interdependence" with an otherwise private project, the actions of the
private sponsor could not "be considered to have been so 'purely private'
as to fall without the scope of the fourteenth amendment."3 1  It has
been this standard that courts have attempted to apply in the subsidized
housing eviction cases. 32 What action on behalf of the state is sufficient
to cause the state to so insinuate itself into a position of interdependence
with the landlord? This turns a "sifting [of] facts and weighing [of]
circumstances." 33  While the use of state eviction proceedings,3 4 . the
receipt of federal funds, 3a5 or the benefit of lower real estate taxes3 6 have
been found not to individually support a finding of state action, a com-
(1967) ; Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEXAs L. REV. 347 (1963) ; Note,
State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity,
74 COLUM. L. REV. 656 (1974).
30. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
31. Id. at 725. The First Circuit Court of Appeals, in finding sufficient state action
to require good cause evictions for tenants of federally subsidized housing, was equally
troubled in its attempt to verbalize the requirements of the fourteenth amendment:
[W]hile we disavow any effort to be definitive, we conclude that at least when a
specific governmental function is carried out by heavily subsidized private firms
or individuals whose freedom of decision-making has, by contract and the reserved
governmental power of continuing oversight, been circumscribed substantially
more than that generally accorded an independent contractor, the coloration
of state action fairly attaches.
McQueen v. Druker, 438 F.2d 781, 784-85 (1st Cir. 1971).
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), marked the begin-
ning of a new approach to, and possibly the decay of, see id. at 366 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting), the state action doctrine. The case was unusual in that it presented several
aspects of the doctrine to the Court for simultaneous review. Mr. Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, analyzed the various aspects of state involvement individually
rather than as presenting a single state action issue. The effect of this was to negate
the effect of an over all impression of state involvement and to institute a sequential
test: the grounds for finding state action are reviewed sequentially until one is found
to be present; at that point the analysis ends. This approach met with swift criticism.
See id. at 359-64 (Douglas, J., dissenting: "It is not enough to examine seriatum
each of the factors upon which a claimant relies and to dismiss each individually as
being insufficient to support a finding of state action. It is the aggregate that is con-
trolling." Id. at 360.); The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARv. L. REV. 47,
139-51 (1975).
32. See, e.g., McQueen v. Druker, 317 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Mass. 1970), aff'd,
438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971) ; Appel v. Beyer, 39 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 7, 114 Cal. Rptr.
336 (1974); Bonner v. Park Lake Housing Dev. Fund Corp., 70 Misc. 2d 325, 333
N.Y.S.2d 277 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
33. 365 U.S. at 722.
34. McGuane v. Chenango Court, Inc., 431 F.2d 1189 (2d Cir. 1970) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971).
35. Id. It is patently obvious that the receipt of federal funds by a landlord, in
itself, is not a state action.
36. Weigand v. Afton View Apartments, 473 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1973).
1976]
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bination of these factors may be sufficient. Thus, the federal courts have
consistently held that local government approval of the construction of
subsidized housing, when combined with the use of state eviction pro-
ceedings 7 or the assessment of lower municipal real estate taxes,38 is
action that so far insinuates the state into a position of interdependence
with the landlord that the provisions of the fourteenth amendment are
operative. 39  In Green the record indicated that the only state involve-
ment was the use of the state eviction proceedings. In accordance with
the treatment rendered by the federal courts, the Court of Special Appeals
determined that this was insufficient to constitute the degree of state
action needed to invoke the fourteenth amendment's due process clause.40
The finding that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
was not applicable did not, of course, dispose of the case. For if suffi-
cient federal involvement were found, application of the due process
clause of the fifth amendment was required. The definition of "sufficient
federal involvement" has also been an elusive one. Perhaps the most
widely recognized standard is that "when authority derives in part from
Government's thumb on the scales, the exercise of that power by private
persons becomes closely akin, in some respects, to its exercise by Govern-
ment itself."'4 1 Did the federal government have its "thumb on the scales"
in Green? The Court of Special Appeals, adopting the rationale of
Anderson v. Denny,42 determined that it did.43 In Anderson, tenants of
a housing project subsidized under section 236 of the National Housing
Act were held to have the right to require a showing of good cause prior
to eviction, this protection being based in part upon the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. The court noted a well defined pattern of
37. Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973); Anderson v. Denny, 365 F.
Supp. 1254 (W.D. Va. 1973); McClellan v. University Heights, Inc., 338 F. Supp.
374 (D.R.I. 1972).
38. Short v. Fulton Redev. Co., 390 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Short did
not consider the possible effect of Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345
(1974). See note 31 supra. All three factors were present in McQueen v. Druker, 317
F. Supp. 1122 (D. Mass. 1970), aff'd, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971).
39. The decision to focus upon a combination of factors to establish state action
must now be reconsidered in light of Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345
(1974). See note 31 supra. But cf. The Supreme Court - 1974 Term, supra note 31,
at 149 & n.67.
40. 28 Md. App. at 512, 346 A.2d at 694. The court cited McGuane v. Chenango
Court, Inc., 431 F.2d 1189 (2d Cir. 1970) (per curiam), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
994 (1971).
41. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
42. 365 F. Supp. 1254 (W.D. Va. 1973).
43. Accord, Dew v. McLendon Gardens Associates, 394 F. Supp. 1223 (N.D. Ga.
1975) ; Short v. Fulton Redev. Co., 390 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ; Bloodworth v.
Oxford Village Townhouses, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 709 (N.D. Ga. 1974); McQueen v.
Druker, 317 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Mass. 1970), aff'd, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971);
Appel v. Beyer, 39 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 7, 114 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1974); Bonner v. Park
Lake Housing Dev. Fund Corp., 70 Misc. 2d 325, 333 N.Y.S.2d 277 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
260 [VOL. 36
DUE PROCESS ON EVICTION
federal involvement through the benefits the government conferred upon
the landlord44 and the restrictions it imposed.45 The court also found
that subsidized landlords help to implement the congressional policy of
providing decent housing to low income families46 and have the power
to deprive tenants of the federal benefits they receive through low
rentals.47 In light of these observations the court's conclusion that the
landlords had "made themselves government actors" 4s seemed inevitable.
As Anderson was factually indistinguishable from Green, the Maryland
court felt justified in applying its rationale to find sufficient federal in-
volvement.4 9
Having determined that the fifth amendment's guarantee of "due
process of law" was available to Ms. Green, it was necessary to focus on
the second prong of the test: Was Ms. Green deprived of "life, liberty,
or property" by the ejectment proceedings? As she contended that the
eviction deprived her of a "property" right,5 0 it was upon that aspect of
the due process clause that the court centered: its attention. While the
Supreme Court has never spoken on the possible existence of a property
right in tenants of subsidized housing,51 it has been quite active in de-
44. These benefits included reduced mortgage rates on up to ninety-five percent
of the construction costs, rental supplements, tax benefits, and the guaranteed payment
of construction costs. 365 F. Supp. at 1257.
45. The landlord was restricted in the following ways:
(1) the amount of rent that may be charged; (2) admission to the project is
limited to persons of specified income levels; (3) the landlord cannot discriminate
on account of children in a family; (4) preference in admission must be given to
families displaced by government activities; (5) the landlord cannot convey,
transfer or encumber the property; (6) without written approval of the Federal
Housing Administration, the landlord cannot convey a beneficial interest in the
property or convey a right to manage it or collect its rent nor can he remodel, add
to or destroy a portion .of the property; (7) the landlord must maintain the mort-
gaged property in good condition subject to FHA inspection; (8) the owners can-
not voluntarily go into bankruptcy; and (9). the owners must furnish monthly
occupancy reports and must answer questions relative to income, assets, liabilities,
contracts, operation and condition of the property and the status of the mortgage.
Id.
46. Id. at 1258-59.
47. Id. at 1259.
48. Id.
49. This result appears proper, for the series of restrictions imposed by the federal
government, see note 45 supra, show its intention of maintaining firm control over
every aspect of the management of the housing project. "[T]he government as land-
lord is still the government." Rudder v. United States, 226 F.2d 51, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
50. 28 Md. App. at 505, 346 A.2d at 691.
51. But cf. Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 386 U.S. 670 (1966). A tenant of a
subsidized housing project received notice of the termination of her tenancy one
day after being elected president of a tenants' organization. No reason for the termi-
nation was offered. The majority, in a per curiam opinion, avoided the tenant's allega-
tions of interference with her first and fourteenth amendment rights by remanding
the case for consideration of the effect of a HUD directive issued subsequent to the
Court's granting of certiorari. That directive required local authorities to notify
tenants of the reasons for their evictions. Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring, protested
19761
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veloping notions of property rights in general. In the seminal case of
Goldberg v. Kelly,52 the Court was called upon to determine whether due
process required an evidentiary hearing for welfare recipients prior to the
termination of their benefits. While there was no substantial contention
that the due process clause was inapplicable, the Court commented upon
the scope of the protection afforded by that clause and in so doing dis-
carded the traditional distinction between "right" and "privilege" :53
[Welfare] benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons
qualified to receive them. Their termination involves state action that
adjudicates important rights. The constitutional challenge cannot
be answered by an argument that public assistance benefits are "a
'privilege' and not a 'right.'" Relevant constitutional restraints apply
as much to the withdrawal of public assistance benefits as to dis-
qualification for unemployment compensation, or to denial of a tax
exemption, or to discharge from public employment. The extent to
which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is in-
fluenced by the extent to which he may be "condemned to suffer
grievous loss," and-depends upon whether the recipients interest in
avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary
adjudication.54  :
that the Court was providing no guidelines for the state court (a protest that appeared
well founded when the case again visited the Court in 393 U.S. 268 (1969)), and
discussed the merits of the tenant's allegations. While his opinion is heavily in-
fluenced by the first amendment considerations that the case presented, he noted that
"[u]nder the rationale of the North Carolina Supreme Court, a public housing
authority, organized under state law and operating a housing project financed by
federal and state funds, is assimilated to the position of a private property owner who
can terminate a lease for any reason or no reason at all." 386 U.S. at 676. To this he
responded, "Arbitrary action is not due process." Id. at 678, citing Rudder v. United
States, 226 F.2d 51, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
52. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See note 54 infra.
53. See, e.g., Bailey V. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an
equally divided Court, 341 'U.S. 918 (1951) (per curiam); K. DAVIs, AD INISTRATV
LAw TEXT § 7.12 (3d ed. 1972):
The idea of privilege seems rather clearly to be something more than a mere
label that is attached after the solution of a legal problem has been worked out
on other grounds. The typical thinking is that one has no "right" to a govern-
ment gratuity, that one who has no "right" at stake should not be entitled to a
hearing, that in absence of a "right" one should not even be entitled to judicial
review of an administrative denial of the gratuity or privilege, that due process
protects only "life, liberty, or property" and not privileges, and that therefore
courts are not called upon to require fair hearings when nothing more than
privileges are at stake.
But see Bishop v. Wood, .96 S. Ct. 2074, 2082 n.4 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The criticism of the "right" - "privilege" distinction arose long before the
Court discarded it in Goldberg. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733
(1964) ; Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 FIARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
54. 397 U.S. at 261-62 (citations omitted). The continued vitality of Goldberg
was put in question by the Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976). In
Eldridge, the Social Security disability benefits of the respondent were terminated prior
to a Goldberg-type hearing. See text accompanying note 73 infra. As Goldberg had
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The Supreme Court refined its Goldberg holding in the companion
cases of Board of Regents v. Roth5" and Perry v. Sinderman.5 6 Roth,
who had been hired to teach at a state university for one year, demanded
a hearing when he was informed without explanation that his contract
would not be renewed. The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Stewart,
held that Roth had not been denied any property right so as to invoke the
due process clause:
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have
more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than
a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate
claim of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of the ancient institution
of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their
daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined."
provided for an evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of benefits received by
welfare recipients, Eldridge challenged the administrative procedures established by
HEW, claiming a denial of due process under the fifth amendment. Mr. Justice Powell,
writing for the Court, applied the Goldberg balancing test, see text accompanying this
note, and found the scales to tip in favor of the state's interests. 96 S. Ct. at 909-10.
Concluding that a pretermination hearing was not required, Goldberg was distinguished
on three levels. First, the termination of disability benefits was found to impose a
lesser hardship than the termination of welfare benefits. This conclusion was justified
by observations that: (1) as eligibility for Social Security disability benefits is not
based upon financial need alone, recipients may have other forms of income or support
available and, (2) upon termination, other forms of governmental subsidy may be
available. Id. at 906-07 & n.27. The dissent took issue with the Court on this point
and, noting that the Eldridge family lost its home and furniture 'as a result of the
termination of disability benefits, argued "that the Court's consideration that a dis-
continuance of disability benefits may cause the recipient to suffer a limited deprivation
is no argument. It is speculative." Id. at 910 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
Secondly, as eligibility for Social Security disability is dependent upon a "medically
determinable physical or mental impairment," 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (1) (A) (1970),
and medical testimony does not generally involve questions of credibility and
veracity, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 405-06 (1971), the Court claimed that
"[t]he potential value of an evidentiary hearing, or even oral presentation to the
decision maker, is substantially less in this context than in Goldberg." 96 S. Ct. at 907.
The conclusion that medical testimony does not generally involve questions of credi-
bility and veracity will no doubt be subject to strong criticism. Finally, noting that
the knowledge that full benefits would continue until after hearings were held would
result in heavy demands for hearings, the Court pointed to the costs involved and the
need to preserve "scarce fiscal and administrative resources." Id. at 909. As identical
policy considerations were present in Goldberg, this final argument arguably works to
undermine Goldberg and to limit that case to its facts.
Whatever the full impact of Eldridge upon Goldberg, it is sufficient for this
discussion to note that while the need to hold the pretermination evidentiary hearing
may have undergone revision, Goldberg's extension of the "property interests" pro-
tected under the due process clause has not. See 96 S. Ct. at 901-02. But see note 62
infra. As pre-eviction hearings are required by statute in Maryland, see note 5 supra,
it may be concluded that Eldridge has no effect upon the result reached in Green.
55. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
56. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
57. 408 U.S. at 577 (emphasis added).
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In contrast, Sinderman had been teaching at a state college for ten years
under a series of one-year contracts. When notified that this contract
would not be renewed he requested a hearing, alleging that the college
had a de facto tenure program that encompassed his period of service.
The Court, again through Mr. Justice Stewart, held that this was a
sufficient property interest to require a due process hearing: "A person's
interest in a benefit is a 'property' interest for due process purposes if
there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his
claim of entitlement to the benefit ...."58
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Caulder v. Durham Housing
Authority,59 applied the Goldberg test to find a right to due process pro-
tection for tenants of subsidized housing.60 The court pointed to the
grievous loss suffered by"those who cannot afford acceptable housing and
the delay that wrongfully evicted tenants would face in reentering the
highly popular program.61 The classification of the tenant's interest as a
"right" or a "privilege" was deemed irrelevant. To fit Roth and Sinderman
into the subsidized housing arena, 62 the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals in Green adopted'. the approach of Joy v. Daniels.13  As the
Supreme Court had required "legitimate claim[s] of entitlement," "rules,"
or "mutually explicit understandings" to support a claim of a property
interest, the court in Joy looked to "statutes," "governmental regulations,"
and the "custom and understandings of public landlords" to convincingly
establish a tenant's property interest in his tenancy.64 The congressional
58. 408 U.S. at 601 (emphasis added).
59. 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971).
60. See Note, Procedural Due Process in Government-Subsidized Housing, 86
HARv. L. Rv. 880, 903-10 (192) [hereinafter cited as Note, Procedural Due Process].
61. 433 F.2d at 1003. See also McQueen v. Druker, 317 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Mass.
1970), aff'd, 438 F.2d 781 (1971). The Caulder court noted that Goldberg "laid to
rest" a series of conflicting public housing cases, some of which required that a
governmental landlord have cause to evict, see, e.g., Vinson v. Greenburgh Housing
Authority, 29 App. Div. 2d 338, 288 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1968), and some of which held
that a governmental landlord had the same right as a private landlord to evict a tenant
upon the expiration of his lease without assigning reasons for his action, see, e.g.,
Chicago Housing Authority v. Stewart, 40 Ill. 2d 23, 237 N.E.2d 463 (1968); Housing
Authority v. Turner, 201 Pa. Super. 62, 191 A.2d 869 (1963). 433 F.2d at 1002.
62. See, e.g., Lopez v. Henry Phipps Plaza South, Inc., 498 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.
1974); Bloodworth v. Oxford Village Townhouses, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 709 (N.D. Ga.
1974); Anderson v. Denny, 365 F. Supp. 1254 (W.D. Va. 1973). The continued
vitality of Roth and Sinderman has been placed in question by Bishop v. Wood, 96
S. Ct. 2074 (1976). See id. at 2080-82 (Brennan, J., dissenting), 2085 (White,
J., dissenting).
63. 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973).
64. 479 F.2d at 1240. See Fenner v. Bruce Manor, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 1332 (D.
Md. 1976). In Fenner, tenants in housing subsidized under sections 221(d) (3) and
236 demanded a hearing prior to an increase in their rent. Rejecting the claim that
the fifth amendment's due pr6cess clause prohibits rental increases unless there is a
prior hearing, the court declined to recognize the existence of a "property" interest:
[T]here is a vast difference in the right to occupy premises beyond the term of
a lease and the right to occupy premises at a certain fixed rental. The Court in
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goal of providing "a decent home and suitable living environment for
every American family," 5 when coupled with the right to be "free of
invidious discrimination in federally assisted programs" 68 arguably creates
a legitimate claim of entitlement to a tenancy.67 Federal Housing Ad-
ministration regulations implying a right to be free from arbitrary or
discriminatory action68 and a congressional report concluding that tenants
may continue to live in subsidized housing when their incomes increase6 9
may be said to be rules that establish a property interest in a tenancy.
70
Joy found that Congress, in enacting the legislation, was contemplating more
occupancy entitlement than limited leasehold terms and that this expectation
of some degree of permanency was bolstered by custom. . . .But there is not
such expectation or custom insofar as the fixing of rents is concerned.
Id. at 1346.
65. 12 U.S.C. § 1701t (1970), citing 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970).
66. 479 F.2d at 1241. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970) :
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance
The Joy court cited a policy of statutory interpretation developed in Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 390-91 (1970), to explain that the policy reflected
in this statute "carries significance beyond [its] particular scope. The policy thus
established has become itself a part of our law . ..."
67. See Appel v. Beyer, 39 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 7, 15, 114 Cal. Rptr. 336, 341
(1974).
68. As an example, the Joy court cited 24 C.F.R. § 221.536 (1975), which
provides that a section 221(d) (3) landlord may not discriminate against a family
because of children. It would appear difficult to infer from this regulation alone a
general right to be free from arbitrary or discriminatory action and, in turn, a
right to a property interest in a tenancy.
69. H.R. No. 365, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2614, 2618:
If his income increases sufficiently so that he can pay the full economic rent
with 25% of his income, rent supplement payments on his behalf would cease
to be made. The tenant could, however, continue to live in the project and would
not be required to pay more than the full economic rent.
The Joy court concluded that "this suggests the Congress was contemplating more
occupancy entitlement than limited leasehold terms." 479 F.2d at 1241. This con-
clusion is also a tenuous one because the report, on its face, merely purports to
set the maximum rent to be paid by those tenants experiencing an increase in
income. The above quoted passage was drawn from the midst of a discussion
concerning the way in which rental supplements would be used - hardly the
context for Congress to set a policy of "occupancy entitlement."
70. The Joy court's argument is not without its problems. One point not
considered is that the lease, with its provision allowing termination upon thirty days
notice, is a form lease approved of by the FHA. See Note, Procedural Due Process,
supra note 60, at 903. This would appear to undermine the argument that the
federal government, through its regulations, has attempted to create an expectancy
of continuous occupation. Why, it may be asked, has not the Secretary acted under
the powers conferred in 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1(h) (1970) to require landlords to state
good cause for all evictions? The Secretary has done so with respect to federally
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Finally, the finding that there is a custom in subsidized housing that allows
a tenant to remain beyond the expiration of his lease7 1 may satisfy the
Sinderman requirement of "mutually explicit understandings." While
each of these points may be insufficient individually to create a property
right, the combination of them fairly may be said to come within the reach
of Roth and Sinderman. The claim to a tenancy is an important one,
one "upon which people rely in their daily lives." 72
Having found both the existence of sufficient federal involvement
to make the fifth amendment applicable and the necessary deprivation of
an interest in "life, liberty, or property" to invoke the due process clause,
the Court of Special Appeals was faced with one final question. Was
Ms. Green deprived of her property without due process of law? In the
context of lease termination in subsidized housing projects, Goldberg v.
Kelly has been held to require
(1) timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed
termination, (2) an opportunity on the part of the tenant to confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses, (3) the right of a tenant to
be represented by counsel, provided by him to delineate the issues,
present the factual contentions in an orderly manner, conduct cross-
examination and generally to safeguard his interests, (4) a decision,
based on evidence adduced at the hearing, in which the reasons for
decision and the evidence relied on are set forth, and (5) an impartial
decision maker.73
While Ms. Green conceded that the Maryland eviction statute met these
procedural requirements, 74 she contended that procedural due process
also required that good cause for eviction be alleged and proved by the
landlord.75 May a tenant entitled to a due process hearing upon eviction
be evicted merely upon the expiration of a lease? The courts that have
considered this question in the post-Goldberg era have unanimously
answered it in the negative by defining the due process property interest
to require evictions only upon a showing of good cause, observing that
otherwise such an eviction would "enable secret and silent discrimination
supported public housing. See Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 386 U.S. 670, 672
n.3 (1967) (per curiam).
71. 479 F.2d at 1241, citing Note, Procedural Due Process, supra note 60,
at 905.
72. 408 U.S. at 577.
73. Caulder v. Durham Housing Authority, 433 F.2d 998, 1004 (4th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971). See also Escalera v. New York City Housing
Authority, 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970); Anderson v. Denny, 365 F. Supp. 1254
(W.D. Va. 1973). See note 54 supra.
74. The requirement of adequate notice was ostensibly met by the landlord's
notice stating the reason for termination to be the expiration of the lease term.
Ms. Green's contention that this was an insufficient reason formed the basis of
her complaint.
75. 28 Md. App. at 502, 346 A.2d at 689.
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and would wholly emasculate the procedural safeguards.. .,,"7 of
Goldberg." The Court of Special Appeals concurred with this view.7 8
Perhaps the most important feature of Green is its provision for a
remedy in the state court system. By interpreting the state's eviction
statute to allow eviction only upon the government landlord's pleading
and proving of cause,79 the court has made it unnecessary for the evicted
tenant to acquire an attorney to bring suit in the federal or state courts,80
an expense that a tenant of a subsidized housing project can ill afford.
But even more important than this reduction in costs is the fact that the
hurdles in establishing federal court jurisdiction may be so great as to be
insurmountable, leaving the wrongfully evicted tenant with no remedy
should his state court system fail to recognize the existence of a fifth
amendment right to a good cause eviction.
76. Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1242 (4th Cir. 1973).
77. See McQueen v. Druker, 317 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Mass. 1970), aff'd, 438
F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971); Appel v. Beyer, 39 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 7, 15, 114 Cal.
Rptr. 336, 341 (1974). ("A necessary corollary is that appellants may not be deprived
of that status through eviction from their home by governmental action without
prior notice and proof of good cause.") ; Bonner v. Park Lake Housing Dev. Fund
Corp., 70 Misc. 2d 325, 333 N.Y.S.2d 277 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
Absent the need to show good cause, an ideal tenant, represented by counsel
before an independent trier of fact, able to present a number of persuasive character
witnesses and able to rebut successfully any adverse statement upon the cross-
examination of the landlord's witnesses, could still be evicted merely upon the
termination of his lease. But since procedural due process requires such a hearing,
the courts have argued, it must also require that the hearing be a meaningful
hearing - hence the imposition of the good cause standard. As the courts have gone
beyond the mere procedural demands of due process to define the substantive de-
mands of the hearing, the temptation to define "good cause" in terms of substantive
due process is great. But the issue of substantive due process has been largely
ignored in the cases. Where it has been recognized, it has been considered un-
necessary to discuss: "[In view of our holding that the congressional scheme and
custom give plaintiff a right to remain in her apartment we need not decide whether
her claim is also protected by equal protection and 'substantive' due process." Joy
v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1242 (4th Cir. 1973).
78. 28 Md. App. at 516, 346 A.2d at 697. It is important to note that the
mere proof of good cause for eviction at the hearing is not enough. Due process
requires that the tenant be provided with notice of the grounds upon which eviction
is sought. Id. at 517, 346 A.2d at 697.
79. "We find no constitutional impediment to utilizing summary Maryland
statutory eviction procedures provided proper notice is given and good cause for
eviction is shown at hearing." Id.
80. While an attorney would be as necessary in state court as in federal court
should the tenant bring suit to obtain relief from a wrongful eviction, the important
point is that while previously a tenant would have had to go through summary
eviction proceedings before seeking redress in federal court, he may now obtain the
same remedy by defending against the ejectment action in the state's summary pro-
ceedings. As a result the procedure is streamlined and legal expenses are reduced.
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There are two basic ways in which tenants have sought to establish
federal court jurisdiction: through allegations of the denial of their civil
rights8 ' and through federal question jurisdiction.8 2  The Civil Rights
Act of 187183 imposes liability on any person who under color of state
law deprives any citizen of his constitutional rights.8 4 Original jurisdic-
tion is granted to the district court to redress this deprivation if it occurs
cc y"85
"under color of any State law . . . regulation, custom or usage ... .
While federal court jurisdiction is available to prevent the landlord from
depriving the tenant of his constitutional right to be evicted only upon
cause,8 6 it is available only if there is state action.8 7 As state action was
not present in Green, 8s tenants at the Copperstone Circle Apartments
would have been unable to assert jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act.
Federal question jurisdiction exists in "all civil actions wherein the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 . . . and arises
under the Constitution . . . of the United States."8' 9 The difficulty arises
with the attempt to establish an amount in controversy exceeding $10,000.
While some authorities have stated that the amount in controversy will
not be so high in an eviction case,90 the current trend appears to call
for computation of the value of the lease over the tenant's life expectancy.9l
This quite obviously would create jurisdictional problems for the elderly. 92
81. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
83. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 stat. 13.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
85. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970).
86. See Caulder v. Durham Housing Authority, 433 F.2d 998, 1001 (4th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971).
87. See McGuane v. Chenango Court, Inc., 431 F.2d 1189 (2d Cir. 1970)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971); Weigand v. Afton View Apart-
ments, 473 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1973).
88. See notes 28-40 and accompanying text supra.
89. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
90. McGuane v. Chenango Court, Inc., 431 F.2d 1189 (2d Cir. 1970) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971); Note, Procedural Due Process, supra
note 60, at 903 n.114 (1973).
91. This is apparently the view of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. Joy v.
Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1239 n.6 (4th Cir. 1973) (dictum). See Bloodworth v.
Oxford Village Townhouses, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 709, 714 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Anderson
v. Denny, 365 F. Supp. 1254, 1259 (W.D. Va. 1973).
92. 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (i) (4) (Supp. IV, 1974): "At least 20 per centum of
the total amount of contracts for assistance payments . . . shall be available for use
only with respect to projects which are planned in whole or in part for occupancy
by elderly or handicapped families."
The fair market rental of Ms. Green's apartment was $215.52 monthly,
with her lease requiring a monthly payment of $137.00, 26 Md. App. at 501, 346
A.2d at 688. Based upon a savings of $78.52 per month, a tenant would need a
life expectancy of ten years and eight months to establish a sum in controversy
in excess of $10,000.
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By circumventing these problems, the Court of Special Appeals has given
tenants the means of enforcing a right they may otherwise find un-
enforceable. 93
While Green does not extend the length of tenancies in housing
that remains outside the scope of the fifth or fourteenth amendment, it
is at least an implicit acceptance of Congress' recognition of the need to
provide decent living quarters for all. In limiting the arbitrary removal of
tenants, and thus preserving the sense of security a family should have in
establishing its home, the Court of Special Appeals heralded the advent
of the right to housing in Maryland.94
93. Some attempts to establish federal court jurisdiction have been based on
28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970): "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating com-
merce or protecting trade and commerce against restraints and monopolies." Compare
Weigand v. Afton View Apartments, 473 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1973) and Potero Hill
Community Action Comm. v. Housing Authority, 410 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1969) with
Dew v. McLendon Gardens Associates, 394 F. Supp. 1223 (N.D. Ga. 1975) and
Bloodworth v. Oxford Village Townhouses, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 709 (N.D. Ga.
1974).
By joining federal officials as parties and seeking mandamus to prohibit
the issuance of contracts that do not protect tenants from summary eviction, at-
tempts have been made to secure jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970): "The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus
to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to
perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." See Weigand, supra (trial court's rejection
of motion to amend pleadings to include federal officials upheld as within the court's
discretion). But see Bloodworth, supra. (action to prevent elimination of electrical
service).
94. See generally Michelman, supra note 18.
